

10 Feb 2021

Stable Matching

Announcements

- ① Most of you are now invited to join 4820 on Canvas. We'll do another enrollment sync this afternoon.
- ② Recall (IS partner finding event Thurs (tomorrow) 9-10:30pm for 4000 level. URL can be found in Monday's lecture notes. ("Lectures" section of 4820 course website.)
- ③ Meet Caroline Lui. She can answer chat questions.

Can job markets function more efficiently if they are centralized?

Gale & Shapley (1962),

Imagine there are n firms and n workers.

Each firm has a ranking of all workers in order of preference.

Each worker has a ranking of all firms in order of preference.

What does it mean to "do a good job matching workers to firms"?

Definition. A matching is stable if there are no two pairs (f_1, w_1) and (f_2, w_2) such that

• f_1 prefers w_2 to w_1

• w_2 prefers f_1 to f_2 .

(Such a configuration is called a blocking pair.)

A matching with a blocking pair is not "self-enforcing."

Examples.

	Top choice	2nd choice		Top	2nd
f_1	w_1	w_2	w_1	f_1	f_2
f_2	w_1	w_2	w_2	f_1	f_2

The red & blue matching is the only stable one.

	Top	2nd		Top	2nd
f_1	w_1	w_2	w_1	f_2	f_1
f_2	w_2	w_1	w_2	f_1	w_2

The red and blue matchings are both stable.

Both are asymmetric: one favors firms, the other favors workers.

The Proposal Algorithm (Gale-Shapley, 1962)

Initially $\text{match}(f) = \perp$ and $\text{match}(w) = \perp \quad \forall f, w$

// " \perp " represents unmatched.

An implementation would specify a rule for choosing f if more than one meets the condition.

while \exists unmatched firm f that didn't yet make an offer to every worker. :

f picks w , the highest ranked worker it didn't yet make an offer to

f makes offer to w

if $\text{match}(w) = \perp$

$\text{match}(f) = w$

$\text{match}(w) = f$

else

let $f' = \text{match}(w)$

if w prefers f to f'

$\text{match}(w) = f$

$\text{match}(f) = w$

$\text{match}(f') = \perp$

endif

endwhile

output the set of all pairs $(f, \text{match}(f))$.

"pseudocode"

Analyzing the algorithm

1. Does it always terminate?
2. Does it always output a stable matching? We will show something better: it outputs a stable perfect matching.
3. Does it run efficiently? \uparrow every worker and firm are matched.
"Efficient" in 4820 will always mean, "Running time is bounded above by $O(p(n))$ where n denotes input length, and $p(n)$ is a polynomial function of n ."
"The algorithm runs in polynomial time."

Termination: Number of offers increases by 1 in each while loop iteration.

No firm makes an offer to same worker twice \Rightarrow at most n^2 offers are made \Rightarrow the while loop iterates $\leq n^2$ times.

Running time: $\leq n^2$ loop iterations.

How fast can we do one loop

Iteration?

Maintain a FIFO queue of unmatched firms. Initially all firms are in the queue.

At initialization time every firm makes a linked list of workers from most to least preferred. Next offer goes to next worker in linked list. $O(n^2)$

At initialization time every worker makes an array mapping firms to their ranks. $O(n^2)$

With $O(n^2)$ preprocessing time to initialize data structures, the proposal alg can be implemented using $O(1)$ operations per loop iter.

$\Rightarrow O(n^2)$ running time.